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THE CONTRACT OF SUO1 RIPTION TO C ORORAT' STOCK.

If

one.shlould contevlate ti

of the mWcject of the
stock,

iJ-prtance and te

extent

ontr.act of suftscrittiorn to corlorate

and the vast mass of adjudication that has necessarily

resulted from a consideration
appear apparent what is

of its

;rL-cii4es,

it

will not

tht precise scope and intent of this

paper.
For antiaipatin

the ,-any and varied relvtions arising

out of the contract from ths time of the conception to the
time of its

termination,

with t1

cornseuont rights and liar

bilities attendant thereon, together wit'a the ambiguous and
oftimes irreconcilable, attitudes of the different courts toward what they deem a proper construction, it is obvious that
the subject can not here be treated in its entirety but it is
rather intended to presentthe recognized nature and form of
the contract of subscription and what is

bloiovod to be the

precise and imiediate relation the sfoscriber assumes from
?is formal act of affixing his sign.turo to the subscriltion
paper.

A discussion of those topics which relate to sub-

scriptions upon conditions

recedent and rpon slecial terms,

the various p*hases and effects of fraud uion the contract, and

the grolds

that-will justify recission: all

of which are

properly within the scole of a broader review of the subject,
will not be here attompted.
them only so far

as it

A reference will be made to

nqay seen necessary to a proper dis-

cussion of the subjeat more immediately under consideration
and as we have indicated above.
The existence of a corporation was not recog~izoL by the
co

.an law of EnFland.

The privilege of chartering a number

of indoviduals to act in a corporate caraoity ?ras construed
to be the valuable and exclusive prerogative of the Crown,
of Parliament -.

later

and

All astociations of individuals or-

ganizod for corporate purposes and assmiin.g to act rithout
the sanction of express authority from the state were deemed
to have usurped f rctions which they could not lawfully exercise:

their acts and contracts made in furtherance of the

common object were held void and unenforceable.
It

is

manifest Athat the contract of subscription to

the stock of a corporation is
alone.

The rights and liabilities

the creature of the statute
of the subscriber and

his relation to his fellow shareholders, to creditors and
to the state must derend upon the construction placed upon
the statute *nder which the sifoscriition was taken, for

that alone can finally detemine the legality and extent of
his contract.

No rt~hts can be acquired by resorting to the

aomwn law theory of contracts and no liabilities can tihus be

ifietrred.

The prtnciples of the aom-on lwT, 'an

adherence to

which are necessary to the efficacy and enforeeability of
ordinary contracts, have no appllcation to the contract of
subsaription to the stock of a corporation.

No technical

requirements of the comon law need be here observed and reference need be had only to the governing statute as to the
final repository of the requIrments of a legal undertaking.
Perhaps the best. exmple of the imbecility of the eommnon law

In relation to a binding contract of subscription Is the abandonment of the neeerrity of a oo~nzder ttcr,.
so essential to the enforceability of
of no necessary consequence here.

n

r-y

This element
c-nact

is

But while all the above

Is true, It may be -said, that any element which In the: nature
of things is essentially a factor in every contract exists
here as well as elsewhere,

As such may be mentioned the

necessity of competent parties and of rmltual assent.

Without

the incorperation of those elements no true contract would

be possible.
Having thus sustained the conlusion that the statute

foms the basis of all accruing rirhts &xid liabilitiAes a very
brief statement of the methods and form that will suserve a
valid and binding subscription will suffice for the pimPoses
If the statute prescribes no

of this paper.

ctLaular form

of subscription and designates no exlpross mode of entering
into the contract, the general rules of law aplicable to the
creation of a binding obligation under like ciraumstances
will here apply.

No formalities are deemed necessary and

any act which in the eyes of the law signifies an intention
to become a shareholder will, if such act in favorably considered by the coomanybind the subscriber and the corpor-

ation alike.

It Is well settled that one *iay be a share-

holder de facto in a corporate body although the manner of
his subscription may have been defective and even though there
may have bean no subscription at. all.

If he assugmes to act

and in fact does act as a constituted maerber of a corporate
association leading sub-,scribers to invest and speculate on
the faith of his alliance and creditors to extend credit to
the corporation on the proscrivtion of that

o:uoitLon, any sub-

sequent attempnt of his to withdra7' or to stifle his liability
on the plea of am incoraplete subscription will be confronted
by the objection of an equitable estop;31.

But when the statute presimaos tp prescribe a mothod of
subsoriptioa the legislative enactment auwst be scruprously
observed in its partioulars.

Yet a substantial compliance

A failure to Ooraly with a technical

will satisfy the law.

and trivial demand of the statute will not afford sufflioOnt
ground to avoid the binding force of a subscription valid on
other grimds.

But a substantial departure from the rule of

the statute will, engender a void ard useless contract that
can give rise to no rights or a corresponding liability., For
instance, if the statute should require each subscriber to
sign articles of association, a mere signing of the-prelifrinary subscription, paper would not constitute the subscriber'
a stooMolder or render him liable for any of the corporate
obligat, tOn .
A,,:u ;.,ivo

and interesting question but one which will

probably not cause a wide divergence among the authorities
when the question is

fairly presented and necessarily involved

in a given decision, is that occasioned by the inquiry whether
a parel subscriptlon to the stoc. of a coporation is a valid
and binding obligation.
what the unani

To venture a plausible estimate of

ious conclusion shold be will necessitate a

brief reference to the contract in its relation to the coznon

it

law and to the Statuto of Fralds.
far

ba said that so

ima

as the)qtcostion has bo:n directll adJudicatod th-e con-

alusions have been u-nanimous in favor of the validity and
binding force of a parol subscrlVption.
ruling in

Such we find was the

the oft citeod case of Colfax 1otcl Co,

v Lyon,

19

N. W. 780 (Ky.) followed and supported by,
Bullock v Falmouth, 5 S. W. 120 (!iy.)
Cookney's Case, Z De G. & 1. 170.
In the work of Tho pon on "Liability of Stockholders,"
we are confronted by the remark that parol subscriptions are
not

Conducive to a binding contract and eitei
oi

following

eases in su'dozt of hia contention:R. R. Co. v Gazzam,
Vreeland v Stone Co.

32 Pa. St.
20 N.

F.

340.
Eq. 188.

Timnel v Sheldon, 6 Barn. & C. 541.
Hotel v Bolton, 46 Tex. 633.
and the later ease,:. of Fanning v Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 39
is cited by another text writer in support of the same view.
But none of these cases justify the conclusion advanced,
it will be odserved upon an investigati

n of thOese authorities

that in every case the decision of the court involved to a
more or less degree the construction of a statute in its re-

lation to the perol agreomwo':t.

In no, one of

1he cases last

referrod to did the court essay to hold that a -arol contract
of subecrilption, relioved from the mandatory requirements of
a statute, was unenforceableAnd there would som to be no
legitimate reason for a difference of opinion upon this inquiry.

There is nothir:c In the natu.re of the contract which

should require a construction that a writing is necessary in
order to induce a binding obligation, any more than such an
interpretation is necessary in construing ordinary contracts.
A eorporation, for the purpose of effecting Its organization
and- for the purpose of exercising its appropriate functions
as a corporate body, shouldhave as comprehensive a power ineldent thereto as any natural individual requires for the
proper conduct of a private

enterprise.

Ax'ong these leg-

itimate functions is the privilege of disposing of its capital
stook by a parol subscription and have it regarded as an enforceable agreement.
The relation of the contract of subscription to the
Statut& of Frauds while not so apparent on its face will
probably occasion no greater amount of dispuzte.

There are

two provisions of the statute with which the contract is said
to be in conflict and it

is i.rith reference to these provisions

Let us suppose, for

that we will now direct our inquiry.

illustration, that one agrees to subscribe for the stook of
a Oorporation when it shall be formed.
is

When the subscriber

sued for the amount of his subscription may he plead the

statute as a defense, relying especially on the provision
which renders all contracts not to be perforued within a year
void and umenforceable unless in writing ?

There would seem

to be no substantial grotmd for holding that he has this
right:for by a long line of cases, too numerous to admit of
a question, the rule has been established that where the contract could in

the pommible course of events be performed

within a year it is not within the. operation of the statute
althoEugh as a matter of fact it

may not have been performed

within that time.
But there is,

however, an inquiry involving the nature

of the contract and the operation of the statute, which does
not so easily admit of an answer.

If one should subscribe

by parol to the stock of a corporation for ar amount exceeding fifty (50) dollars would his contract be imenforceable
under the Vrovisions of the statute which renders void all
*agreements for the sale of goodsfor the value of fifty
dollars or more" unless in writing ?

(go)

The stock of a corpor-

ation is
sale.

a chose in action and as such r i Ijuct to a valid
Thus it

would be only natural to hold as an obvious

necessity that, the Iarol agreemont could not be enforced.
But the acceptod doctrine would son

to be otherwise.

The construction by wh-ich tais conclusion is attained is based
on the reasonire that in

an original s~bscription the corjor-

ation has no present stcck which can be the subject of a sale.
The subscription agreement
the stock is

itself

is

the instrizriont by which

primarily created: it is thus,

according to this

view, a creation of stock and not a sale, thereby being reA distiiction

lieved from the provisions of t7;e statute.

between stock once iso-eod and then mfojected to a sale and

stock created by the original subscrip1tio

is

the inevitable

consequence necessarily of an adherence to this doctrine.
Holding,

as they do,

that a sale of tho former must comply,

with the statute and the 'mdertaking embodied in
while in the latter intance rtccI

nay -as

a writing,

from the corpor-

ation t6 the suhscriber as a consirhation for his :wbsci

t-

ion and yet the transaction rGEt bdyond tho palc of the statutory enactment.

Such a construction obviously subordinates

the clear and definite p'urpcse of the

the necessities of a barren tech

ptatute of Frauds to

4e7a,.AL

.'..Taking leave now of the discussion of these well establiphed and for the most part undispute. jprineii les of .oorporation law re enter upon a field of investigation only to
be confronted by the many contradictions and distilnction

of

Court adjudications. and text writin,: which have tendiod to

confuse rather than enlighton the present state of judicial
chaos.

There is no more important question Athan that atten-

dent upon a consideration of a subecriber's liability on hissubscription
it

before the organization of the corporation.And

will be the purpose of this paper to now extract,

if

pos-

sible, from the vast mass of authority the true status of a
subscriber so situated with his rights and liabi*ti7es.

To

forrmlate our question:- what is the undertaking of one Who
subscribes for the stoaX of ,a corporation not yot in being but
to be incorporated in the future ?
In view of the uncertainty and confusion which would
otherwise follow it would seem best to state, what is believed

to be, the established rules and then ondeavor to sustain
them, by competent authority.

In compliance iherefore the

conelusion is ventured t~iat in a 'pure orthodox wabscription
before incorporation, as distinguished from an agrement to

xubscrlbe, the transaction is in the nature of a continuing

offer to become a shareholder In the prospective corporation,
w)Idh offer is made to the corporation and can in no sense be
regarded as a binding contract. existing between the several
subscribers; and further that the offer .iay be accepted by the.
properly constituted agents of the corporation which acceptanee will transform it inlto a binding and irrevocable agreement, but that at any time before a due acceptance the subscriber may revoke and withdraw the offer, thereby divesting
himself of all rights in the rrospecotive corporation and relieve him from all suIbsequaent possible liability.

Excluding

the last element as to the power of revocation it is believe&
there is no judicial decision now extan:,

which in given the

ereditof being responsible authority and where the question
was directly adjudicated, in which the propositions as 1,id
down are denied.

But it here to be observed .again that re-

ference is had only to a

m-iat toi

and

simgl"

41s8ti uished from an.aLrobzont too subscribe whidh some courts
have construed to be quite a different underteahing.
But the soundness of the above proposition-s would not
seem apparent upon a casual reading of the cases and text
books, and indeed it can only be adLmitted that the contrary
would seem well established,

in

some jilpdica&ons at least.

A most careful and laborious scrutinizing of the cases is
essential in order to discern the true status of af'fairc, but
it is believed such an invoti~sation v:ill beer out and Support the above propozitions.

The main source of confusion

would seem to be in the distinatin drawn by a considerable
nmber of the courts between a present su'czcription and an
agreement to

bsc'ribe, but this will be considered presently.

While not attempting to analyze all the aparently
hostile statements of various authorities it will be profitable to refer to one erroneous conclusion of a text writer so
offoqn misleading because of 'he unblushing character of the
assertion.

Cook in Vol. 1. of his work on "Stockholders

ad

Corporation Law" after developing and sustaining the principle that a subscription is a ncro offer to the prospective
eorporation and not an agroemont among the several subscribers.
informs us that a contrary rule prevails in New York and
cites the case of Lake Ontario Shore R.R. v Cittiss, aC N.Y.
219 as authority.

,Put an exarpdinatlon of that case
remark.

viU. not justify the

In the first :lace tho contract broaht to the

attention of the court resolvd itsclf into an agrcci:ont to
subscribe and was in no sense a present suioscri-.ion.

In

the second place the decision of the court rested upon the
fact that the sbscri-1ton was made upon a condition precedent wbich condition had not been performed; and all that was
said by the learned judgc vho delivered the opinion not bearing on the precie

point in

issue was not

:;t1,

adjudged

sentiment of the court but nere dicta.
And the rule as laid down should commend itxelf to a
careful and considerate judgment for it
ions fundamental and natural.

is

based on conclus-

The pritlary scope and fun-

etion of a subscription to the stock of a corporation is

an

offer to become a shareholder on consideration of the company extending

the benefits and privileges resulting from

such a situation.

It is primarily an offer to the corpor -

It is not

ation intended to be accepted by the corporation.

the pin pose of the agreemnent to obligate one subscriber- to
another and is
is

not i-ade to oporate between them.

Mile it

true the subscription of one is often, and perhaps always,

the sole inducement and consideration for the agroement of
the others yet this alone i
dence to establish a mocting

not sutficient competent,
'f the 41inds.

Such a procedure

is merely a riothod of bringing the partios together.
intend to deal with the

aor

evi-

They

3oration anrl bind themselves to it

alone.

The corporation accepts or rejects the offer at its

will regardless of the provisions of the prior agreement
wmong the Individual subscribers; aid if accepted the OomPan
convoys the stock acting in its own corporate caacitynot in
the pirsuance,

prirarily,of the original indertaklng of the

several subscribers but in accordance with the tens of the
new contract initiated by. its own acceptance.
The trnie, soixnd and logical doctrine was wiell eniunciated
in the leading case of Athal :-usic Hall Co. v Carey, 11G Mass.

at page 470 in which Wells, J. said:- "In agreements of this
nature entered into before the organization is formed or the
agents constituted to receive the amount subscribed, the diffieulty is to ascertain the xroniisoe in whose naame alone suit
can be brought.

The

romise of each su scrlber to and with

each other is not a contract capablc of being enforced or intended to operate literally as a contract to be enforoeo

be-

tween each subzcriber and each othcr rho may have signed pre-

vlously, or who would sign afterwards, nor between each other
and a3Jl the others collectively as individu.11als.

The under-

ta ing is inchoate and incomnjletc as a contract until the
eomtemplated organization is offected or the mutual agent
constituted to represent the association of individual rights

Iis

in aeeeptinS and acting upon the propositions offered by the
several subscriptions.

vmen thus accepted the promise maY

be construed to have legal effect according to its Ipurpose
and intent and the practical necessity of the case: to wit,
as a contract with the common representitive of the several
associations .........

Although his promise (referring to the

ease at bar) was originally voluntary or in the nature of a
mere open pproosition, yet having been accolted and acted on
by the party authorized to do so, before he attcmpted to retract it, he has lost his right to revoke.

His promise has

become an accepted mutual contract and is bindlft upon hil

as

well as upon the corporation. "i
It- then being clear that in

a present subscrijtion the

subscriber's rights procod from the corporation and his liability, if any exist, is to that body only and that the remisning subscribers have no resource whatever upon his undertaking, we now grapp~le with a more difficult

proposition.

Various coirts while conceding and sustaining the proposition
heretofore considered refuse to apply the same construction
to a mere agreement to subscribe a'ong the different prozaisors.

It

is

here contended that no proposition is riade to

the corporation,

that imo liability

to that body can arise

therefrom and that if any responsibility is indued by the
eontract at all it exists on behalf of the remaining stb-

seribers.
The doctrine contonded for is best stated by Morawetz in
his excellent work on "Privato Corporations" Vol. I where we
fifn

the following:- "A different case is presented where the

parties mutually agree to subscribe for shares in a corporation to be formed thereafter.

Here there is no uneondit-

ional agreement to become a shareholder as soon as the corporation shall be forned, but it is contemplated. that the
parties shall themselves perform an additional act. before be-

eoming shareholders; 'namely, execute the statutory contract
of mevbership by' subscription upon the stock books.

It is

plain therefore that in this case there is no. offer whieh the
corporation can accept and the parties do not become shareholders and cannot be charged as such unless they subsoqaently
carry out their agreement by subscribing for the shates."
In the illustrative case of Strasblurg R.R.Co. v Echternachlt,

21. Pa.

St.

220 wle find perhaps, the first

exposition of the foregoing position.

and leading

Chief Justice Black

in delivering the opinion of the court Save vent to the following remarks which are the accepted authority of those who

sustain this view and ditinction'- "A contract cannot be
mate by one person alone.

It takes

two to rnalle a bargain.

Before a yromise bocomes a binding oblif,aticn it must not only
be made to, but iust be oxp",:;ly or ir'!1iodly accerted by,

the party for whose benefit it

was noant.

The paper before

us was no more than a nahzed expression of the subscriber's
intention to purchase certain shares in the capital stoet of
a eomr-ay which it was expected would be incorporated by the
legislature.
ation.

Besidee it is without any sufficient consider-

Again if there was a binding engagement it was not
I

made with the Railroad Company which did not exist at the tim
Again in the oft cited case of Thrasher v Pike Co. R.R.
Co, reported in 25 Ill. 340 the court said:-

'it is claimed

by the Vlaintiffs that they are entitled to recover as deanages the par value of the stock.

This, we do not think, is

a fair view of the defendeat's liability on his _,zromise.

His

undertaking is to subscribe a certain xuaowt of stock when
the subseription boohks shouild be opened.

This promise loes

not 'make him a stockholder and as such liable for calls.

The

eompany has parted with no. stock to him and can only alaim
as lamages the actual loss sustained by them by his failure
or refusal to subscribe whon he was 'notified.11

This case

was considered and aproved

in

Quick v Letaon, 105 Ill. 585.
It. Sterling Coal-roar- Co. v Little, 14 :ush 429 C14.)
These authorities wouleL seem to have an acecrate eomprehension of the true nature of the agreonont to subscribe but
in applying the law in the character of a rnedy, fundamental
and natural maxims of jurisprudence are lost sight of.

It is

nnloubtedly true that the immediate contractual relations
exist between the several subscribers and that the agreement
is not a promise made to the oorporation as a direct proposition.

The relation resulting is that of a good contract

In which the promise of one is a sufficient consideration for
the undertaking of each and every other.

Such is,

or at

least should be, undoubted law.
But while it

is

true the original agreement. is

not made

with the corporation, which indeed may not then be in existence, it

is clearly obvious the intent of the parties is

that the contract shall inure te the benefit of the proposed
corporation.

That is

undertaking and is
terms can justify.

the precise scope and meaning of the

manifestly the only construction which its
Now it

is

a universally recognized rule

of simple contract that where two or more individruals jointly

enter into a contract for the bonof'it of a third person, this
beneficiary may maintain a.n action upon the agreement without
the necessity of incoranatinr

ay

'.itional consideration.

There is no sufficient reason 'ahy thr

rule cannot be a7lied

in an action by a corporation to onforcic the socif
formanee of an agreament to zubscribe.

per-

And such aijears tO

be the better rule sw-orte.! by the ,most corrpotent authority.
In the case of Hotel Co. v Giit i, 15 .o. Ap-. 7v14 the
law was well stated by D2]kewell,

J, in the following remarks:-

"It is a rule of simle contract that if one person makes a
promise to another, for the benefit of a third, the thirt may
maintain an action npon it.though the con-iderat ion does not
move from him.

The mutual promiises of the several subscribers

in this case constitute a sufficient consideration, and that
*he promise to pay a third party is not a tenable objection,
and te promise is binding thougt'h the corporation to

which

payment is to be nade is not then in esso but to be formed

thereafter."
Thus it would apy-ear the courts were tending torard the
eonstruction that a corporation may sustain an action to compell the specific performance of an agro.ient to subscribe as
the beneficiary of an exoc,.tory contract.

Prior to its or-

ganIsation the undertaking is

priuarily one between the intl-

vidual subscribers, but on acceptanae by the company the subseribor is

constitutol a qualfiod sharoholder,

is

relieved

of his obligation to the remaining subscribers as such, and
his original contract becomes merged in the one with the corporation, which is

now so situated as to be able to coMpel a

fulfillment of the promise.
A case well illustrating the extreme frailty of the distinetion between a present subscriptt io agn
subscribe is

Tin Creeo

Road Co.

an agreement to

v Lancaster,

79 Ky.

552 fro

whieh we extract the following brief remark of Pryor J,

:-

"The contract in this case, it is true, is made with individual subscribers and not with the eorporatlon.'....but

the

oney

due is for the corporation, and the promise is to pay the
corporation: and the consideration is the mutual a&reement
between these parties to form the ecrporation an
road,

,build the

and when the corporation was created the tefendents

were bound by their subscription.;.
The three cases previously ref erred to: naxnely 25 111.340j
105 Il'

505; and 14 B1ish 429 seem to lay Great stress upon

the fact, as they claim, that th:o

orporation has parted with

no stock to the subscriber which will -r.port

an action for

srpeelfie

performance.

seem to be that

But a sufficient answer to this WP I&1

0te issuance of a certifieate of stock is

never necessary to constitute one a shareholfer; Indeed, the
eirtificate is only evidence of hin right.
anee by the eorporation is

The mere aecept-

enoug-h. to create the relation of a

stoekholder and will bind the eomany and the subscriber
alike.
The attitude of New York in

regard to this question is

deemed by many to still be equivocal and unsettled ant the
ease of Lake Ontario Shore R.R. v CizrtlsE, sirpra, is frequently eited as being in aeoard with the view that sustains the.
distinction and 4enio* the righrt of the corporation to speeifically

enforce the arroonent to subscribe.

But the posit-

ion of the New York courts cannot be said to be in
Lake Gntario R.R.

doubt and

v Curtisss cannot be regardet as authority

to smport the eontention aivancel.

It

is

true that in that

eAse the court refused to enforce an agr(ernent to suocribe,
on behalf of a corporation,

an

it

is

further td be a mittet

that the dicta of the learned jndge who feliverel the opinion

of the cnorte
aertainly sustains the distinction we are #isassin

.
In

But the case is easily distinguishable.
the first

instance the subscriber's agreerent was one

upon condition precedent which condition had not teen 1erformea

as stipulated.

And t1is element was all the decision of the

court essayed to determine.

They denied the right to spe-

elflc performqace upon the one ground that the terms of the
agreement had not bu~en corTied with.

But Danforth,;.

in

his opinion advanced farther than a necessary discussion of
the decision required and gave birth to the remarks which
have given rise to a disproportionato waount of confusion and
mis-interpretation.

The learned Judge submits himself to

the fmailiar error that the corporation not being a party to
the original agreeaent cannot invoke the assistance of the
court to coinpell specific

'erforaance;a fallacy which, it is

hoped, has been made apparent by the foregoing consideration
of the question.
The case of Lake Ontario Shore R.R. v Curtiss was considered in the later decision of Buffalo and Jamestown R.R.Co.
v Gifford, 37 N.Y. 2)4 in which the court interlreted the.
Curtiss case as deciding only that the corporation was not
entitled to specific perforimance while the conditions of the
subscriber's agreement rerained un-o
7 r.d.reL.
cision then proceaded to formulate the

The latter de-

established New

York doctrine.

This adjltdication togethur with that of Lake

Ontario R.R.,o.

v Nason ruortod in IG N.Y. 451 forms the

basis of the'3 law as it exists in New York to-day and will be
found cleprly in
ation may

accord with the proposition that a oorpor-

pecifically enforce an agreement to subscribe as

well as a -,resent
It

renain,

to consv7,, r vory briefly the Ttestion of dax -

.ications
io

ad

ages.

bscrition.

.:ai-h wit'ilhold rrom the cOrpor-

ation the privilege of a coxllete perforuance of a technical
agreoennt to subscribe permit the recovery of such damages as
tie

corporation I as sustained by a failure to perform.

the measure of these damages is

And

ardinatily the difference be-

tween tho iarket value of the stock and the price agreed on.
This conclusion was reached in
Xt. Sterling Coal Road Co. v Little, sup;ra.
Thrasher v Pike Co.

Quich v Lemon,

R.R.Co.,

supra.

surx ,a.

Lake Ontario R.R.ko. v Curtiss, supra.
But it

is

submitted with due deference to those authorities

that the ruling is based on a nisconception of the true and
fuidamental niature of a s oscription to co;?orate stock and
the lfirrpses it

is

intenlol to s c:serve.

1Tor where a nr-ber of Irdividivjs agreo tc valbscribe for

the stocX of a non-existent er*poration, the e.Aitre amount of

capital stock the conany will be authorized to issue is
ided into shares at a stated and fixed iluat
ber Rttehe

in.

div-

Each mem-

his signattre on the assim-ption that every other

Subscriber will be reqaired to forfeit t1,o Par value cf every
share of

tcol l

ass-s

tc pirchpse: the precise contract

he himself has been required to make.
Plate that one shall h'co

He does not 0onteo-

qualifiod shareholder enjoying

the privileges and benofits incident thereto without 1,aYifl
for his stock the sane anount that has been required of him.
But such is

the situation exactly, resulting from an

application of the ;raepasire of di.E:gcs to Thich reference has
Jut been made.

Let us suppose for illustration that one

has so subscribed for stock and later defaulted.

The cor-

poration subsequently sells his stock for a price, we will
assume,

below yar, and is

then pernittod to recover from the

defaulting subscriber the deficiency when compared with the
contract

-rice.

The nrw s

~c2:iber is

thus constituted a

qualified member of the corporation, paying lese for his
stock than was exacted from the others: but entitling him,
nevertheless,
It is

to the same rights and benefits accorded to all.

manifest that such a construction undermines the

fundamental character of the origibal subscriber's agreement,

-

requiretin

him to contribute to the capital stock an amount

disProiortionato to tbo bonefits derived.
Ubscri~ber agroo

The defaulting

to I;ay the :ear value of the stock when a

Oall ObOUld be iuaro and it

is that urerstaudi-nC uion Whiah

the fellow sifoscriters i-ainly rely.
Poration should be to recover ti

The action by the cor-

par value of the storck so

sold and not the rule of denCges ts

advanced by some author-

ities.
To

briefly sirznx, tzz o results of our investiration will

tend to establish more clearly in raind the conclusions reached.

The assertion is ventured that a careful examination of

all the authorities will justify. a reliance upon the accuracy
of the following propositions:1.

A present suf)scription is in the nature of a con-

tinuing offer to the corporation which offer rzay te accepted
by the corporation at any tine before revocation, and that
the agreement is not one anong the individual siboscribers.
.

A corporation nay con7!;ell the performuance of an

agreement to subscribe as having been :&. for its benefit.
3.

A parol subscriltion is a valid and binding contract.

4.

In an action by a ccrporation upon a subscription

the recovery should be the -al valmu

of the stoco. and not

28

domates as measured by tho diffornce betwoen the iaarhet

valUe and the contrarct -,rice of the stock.

--- TI EI
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